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The Moral Obligations of Trust 
 
1.   
This paper has two main targets. The first is Stephen Darwall’s claim that 
moral obligation is essentially second personal. The principal conclusion of 
the paper will be that it is not – or that it is not, as Darwall says of testimony, 
second personal ‘all the way down’. Moral obligation cannot be fully second 
personal because what we are morally obliged to do depends fundamentally 
and irreducibly on facts about the situations we find ourselves in; that is, 
moral reasons are at bottom state-of-the-world-regarding or third personal in 
character. The second target of the paper is Benjamin McMyler’s second 
personal theory of testimony and trust. The other main conclusion reached is 
that one cannot give a second personal theory of either testimony or trust; 
although both are second personal up to a point, neither are so ‘all the way 
down’. As a consequence, or so I argue, neither are the moral obligations that 
are generated by trust. From this it follows that moral obligation cannot be 
essentially second personal in character. 
This paper begins as follows. In the next three sections I outline 
Darwall’s second person account of moral obligation, and then McMyler’s 
second person theories of testimony and trust. The sections after explain first 
why testimony cannot be second personal ‘all the way down’, then why trust 
cannot equally be so, before arguing that this conclusion tells against 
Darwall’s account of moral obligation. 
 
2.   
Let me start with an example that is close to one Darwall is fond of. Suppose 
that I box your car in so that you cannot move your car without me moving 
mine first. When you ask me to move my car, you make a demand of me, and 
part of this demand is that I move my car because you asked me to – not 
because of your inconvenience, or because the regulations say that I must – 
but because, and this is ‘Pufendorf’s point’, I recognise that you are in a 
position whereby you can legitimately make this demand of me. In 
recognising this, I then take your request to give me a particular reason for 
acting, what Darwall calls a second personal reason.1 Moral obligation is then 
                                                   
1 Second person reasons are agent relative: only the person addressed has them. The reason 
provided by your inconvenience is third person agent neutral: any person with access to my 
car keys has this reason to move my car and let you go home. While the reason provided by 
the regulations is third person agent relative: it is my parking in the way I have that is 
prohibited, but the rules apply to all users of the car park. 
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essentially second personal because (a) of its connection to moral 
responsibility and second person reasons and (b) the fact that second personal 
reasons identify a “closed circle of concepts”.2 Consider (b) first. 
Not every form of address gives a second personal reason. A threat 
doesn’t. “A second personal reason”, Darwall says, “is one whose validity 
depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations.” 3  The 
concepts that form a closed circle are then: the authority to make a demand; a 
valid (or authoritative) demand; a second personal reason for acting as 
demanded; and responsibility (or accountability) to someone for acting as 
demanded. A circle can be started at any point, start this one with your asking 
me to move my car, and represent this schematically as ‘X makes the valid 
demand that Y φ’. The circle is then: ‘X makes the valid demand that Y φ’ 
implies ‘X has the authority to demand that Y φ’. In demanding that I move 
my car you presuppose that you enjoy the authority to make this demand, and 
invite me to recognise that you have this authority. In this respect, second 
person address comes with, as Darwall says, “an RSVP”.4 ‘X makes the valid 
demand that Y φ and has the authority to demand this’ then implies ‘X gives Y 
a second personal reason to φ’. In recognizing that you are in a position to ask 
me to move my car, I thereby recognize that your asking me gives me a 
distinctive reason to move my car – a reason that I have by virtue of your 
addressing this request to me. Finally, ‘X gives Y a second personal reason to 
φ’ implies ‘Y is responsible to X for φ-ing’. If I ignore your request, I fail to take 
responsibility for doing what I have a reason to do, and you will rightly resent 
me for this. Your resentment then expresses the view that I wrong you in 
ignoring your request, and a propensity to feel this is a way in which the 
demand that I move my car can be implicitly addressed. 
Suppose it is acknowledged that one can address a valid demand if and 
only if one has the authority to do this. And acknowledged that in demanding 
things of one another we presuppose that we have this authority and that our 
demands are valid. It may nevertheless be asked what makes this 
presupposition true, or where this authority comes from. The short answer to 
this question is that to be an authority is just to be recognized as such. In 
recognizing the legitimacy of a demand, and so the authority to make it, one 
recognizes that one has a second personal reason for acting. Pufendorf’s point 
was that seeing things this way is necessary for a demand being moral rather 
than coercive, Darwall adds the claim that it further suffices for it (and a 
divine origin of the demand is thereby unnecessary). Morality, as Darwall says, 
“is second personal all the way down” resting on no more than a “common 
competence … to enter into second-personal relations of reciprocal address”.5 
                                                   
2 Darwall (2006), pp.11-12. 
3 Ibid., p.8. 
4 Darwall (2007), p.54. 
5 Darwall (2006), p.59 
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A longer answer to the question of the source of moral authority is then a 
statement of what is needed for any form of second-personal address. 
What, then, are the presuppositions of second-personal address? 
Continuing with the car parking case and its schematic representation as ‘X 
makes the valid demand that Y φ’, this presupposes the following. That Y has 
the capacity to acknowledge the demand and recognise the reason that it gives 
him for φ-ing. That Y is rational and so responsive to reasons. And that Y is 
free and so has the liberty to φ. So in asking me to move my car you 
presuppose that I can hear and understand your request, that I can see your 
request as a reason to move my car and am rational, and that I have the 
liberty to move my car. Second personal address then further presupposes – 
and again this is Pufendorf’s point – that Y can recognize X’s demand as valid, 
and so hold himself accountable to X for φ-ing. So in asking me to move my car 
you presuppose that I can see your request as giving me a non-coercive reason 
– a second-personal reason – such that you will feel rightly resentful if I fail to 
comply. The conjunction of these presuppositions Darwall calls second person 
competence.6 Second personal address presupposes mutual second person 
competence. Where there is mutual second person competence, authority 
follows from its endorsement. 
The statement of how moral obligation is second personal is then 
completed with (a): an account of its connection to moral responsibility and 
second person reasons. The connection to moral responsibility, Darwall 
argues, is analytic: “what we are morally obligated to do is … what we are 
warrantedly held responsible for doing”.7 And moral responsibility is one of 
the closed circle of second personal concepts. To be responsible for φ-ing is to 
be the object of reactive attitudes of resentment and blame were one not to φ; 
and to hold another responsible for φ-ing is to be subject to reactive attitudes 
were they not to φ. The reactive attitudes then involve an expectation of 
someone, which is a demand for certain behaviours; and these expectations, 
and so the demands they express, are put forward as justified, and hence 
second personal. 
 
3.   
Having sketched Darwall’s second personal theory of moral obligation, in this 
section I outline how Benjamin McMyler applies it to the case of testimony. 
Second personal reasons are not coercive reasons. If you ask me to 
move my car and then add ‘or else you’ll get towed’, I gain a further quite 
different reason for action: fear of the sanction that would follow ignoring 
                                                   
6 Ibid., p.21. 
7 Darwall (2010), p.221. 
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you. You give me a third person, though agent relative, reason for action.8 This 
distinction between second and third person reasons is a distinction 
respectively between commanding and counselling.9 To offer counsel is to 
advise. If X counsels Y to φ, X lays out the considerations that support φ-ing 
and then leaves it up to Y to decide what to do. If X commands Y to φ, then X 
does not similarly leave it up to Y to decide what to do, rather Y should φ and 
should φ just because X demanded it. This particular distinction, McMyler 
then argues, applies to testimony: it is the distinction between arguing and 
telling. In arguing for p, a speaker X presents reasons for an interlocutor Y to 
believe that p, but leaves it up to Y to make his own mind up. But in telling Y 
that p, X seeks to direct Y’s belief: X’s expectation is that Y believe him and so 
believe that p just for the reason of his telling. 
There are, thereby, two important points of parallel between 
commanding and telling. First, both introduce a distinction between right and 
wrong reasons. Suppose that X commands Y to φ (or, as we say, tells Y to φ). 
The right reason for Y to φ is that X demanded it; if Y φs only because he 
decides to, then Y fails to treat X’s command as a command, or authoritative 
demand, even though he does what X commands. Thus if your polite request 
that I move my car merely reminds me that I stand to be towed if I don’t and I 
move because of this anxiety, then I do not respond to your request even 
though I do what you ask. Similarly, when X tells Y that p, the right reason for 
Y to believe that p is merely that X told him it; if Y believes that p only 
because he judges that X is reliable in these matters and so that X’s telling is 
evidence for p, then Y fails to treat X’s speech-act as telling him that p even 
though in treating it as a bit of evidence he comes to believe that p on its basis 
nevertheless. This distinction, I think, is supported and illustrated by Coady’s 
case of the master criminal who has hypnotized X to tell Y that p.10 If Y knows 
of the master criminal’s scheme, he might believe that p on the basis of 
reasoning that X’s saying what he does is evidence for p, but he would not 
believe X. (In Coady’s terms, X’s utterance fails to be an act of testifying.) 
Second, both have the same deference patterns. Suppose that Y φs and 
is then challenged, why did you do that? If Y φ-ed because X commanded him 
to, the challenge can be simply deferred to X, and so to the authority that X 
has to make this demand. Similarly, if Y’s belief that p is challenged when Y 
formed this belief on the basis of X telling him that p, any challenge to Y’s 
belief can be deferred to X, and so to the authority that X has to tell Y this. 
It is this deference pattern, McMyler claims, that defines testimony as a 
source of knowledge. Testimonial beliefs, by definition, are beliefs that are 
                                                   
8 Darwall is clear that there can be both kinds of reason for the same action, see Darwall 
(2007), p.60.  
9 Darwall (2006), p.12. 
10 Coady (1992), p.45. And see Faulkner (2011), p.25. 
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justified by appeal to authority. “An item of knowledge is testimonial”, 
McMyler says, “just in case it is … justified by appeal to the authority of the 
speaker”.11 And to appeal to an authority just is to manifest these deference 
patterns; it is to defer justificatory challenges to the person who was the 
source of one’s belief, and who one takes to be authoritative. Being told 
something then functions to provide an epistemic right of deferral.  
The best explanation of the fact that an audience is entitled to defer 
certain challenges to her testimonial beliefs back to the original 
speaker is that, in testifying, a speaker is assuming epistemic 
responsibility to meet such challenges.12 
So in telling Y that p, X demands that Y believe him and presents this 
demand, and so his telling, as justified. Were Y to take up the right of deferral 
that X’s telling gives him through a disposition to defer, Y would thereby 
acknowledge X’s epistemic authority, and hold X accountable for meeting any 
justificatory challenges he, Y, might encounter. Thus X’s telling Y that p gives 
Y, McMyler claims, a distinctively second personal reason for belief. It does so 
because it is “a consideration that justifies belief in virtue of relations of 
authority and responsibility existing between an addresser and an 
addressee”.13 
 
4.   
In addition to a second personal theory of testimony, McMyler also gives a 
second personal theory of trust, or at least of that kind of trust appropriate in 
response to a speaker’s telling. Thus McMyler distinguishes between ‘X 
trusting Y to φ’ and ‘X trusting that Y will φ’.14 The former kind of trust is 
second personal and the latter third personal. There are three key differences 
between these kinds. 
First, trusting Y to φ is a second personal attitude and these attitudes, 
which include believing someone and resenting someone, “implicitly call for a 
kind of reciprocal responsiveness from their addressee and thereby presume 
upon an interpersonal relationship between the subject of the attitude and 
the personal object [in this case Y].”15 Take the car parking case: in asking me 
to move my car your attitude could be one of trusting me to move it, and if it 
were so, your attitude, like the demand implicit in your request, would invite 
                                                   
11 McMyler (2011), p.59.  
12 Ibid., p.68. 
13 Ibid., p.94. 
14 McMyler correctly observes this distinction is that between what I term, respectively, 
affective and predictive trust, ibid., n.6, p.119 and Faulkner (2011), ch6§2. Although, we 
disagree, as will become clear, as to whether ‘X trusts Y to φ’ implies ‘X believes Y will φ’. 
15 McMyler (2011), p.122. 
 6 
a certain recognition on my behalf. This is not the case in merely trusting that 
Y will φ. For instance, if you threaten me, ‘move your car or I’ll get it towed’, 
you do not invite any “reciprocal responsiveness”, you merely want me to 
appreciate, and act on, your threat.  
Second, in trusting Y to φ, X renders himself susceptible to various 
reactive attitudes were Y not to φ. A characteristic of reactive attitudes, 
Darwall observes, is that the demand they implicitly address is put forward as 
justified. So McMyler suggests that it is not merely that in trusting Y to φ, X is 
susceptible to resent, or feel betrayed, were Y not to φ, it is further the case 
that in trusting one becomes “entitled to adopt second-personal attitudes like 
resentment.”16 And this is because if I trust a person “there is a sense in which 
she is responsible to me for doing what I trust her to do”.17 None of this is true 
in the third person case. If I do not respond to your threat, at most you will 
feel frustrated and angry, and there is no sense in which I owe it to you to 
respond to your threat.  
Third, while both ‘X trusting Y to φ’ and ‘X trusting that Y will φ’ imply 
‘X believes that Y will φ’ – trust generally is a cognitive attitude – these kinds 
of trust differ in the grounds the subject has for this belief. The grounds in the 
third personal case, in trusting that Y will φ, are the evidence X has for this 
belief. When you trust that I move my car because you threaten me, your 
grounds are your reasons for thinking I will be moved by your threat. By 
contrast, the grounds in the second personal case, in trusting Y to φ, are 
second personal reasons for this belief. These reasons are clearest when the 
second personal attitude of trust is one of trusting a speaker for the truth 
because then the reasons are the second personal reasons generated by the 
speaker’s telling and its accompanying assumption of responsibility. However, 
the second personal trust found in testimony is paradigmatic in that what 
holds here, holds generally: in trusting Y to φ, X’s reasons for believing that Y 
will φ are second personal in that they are based on “the ongoing 
interpersonal relationship existing between truster [X] and trusted [Y]”.18 
 
5.   
A central challenge to assurance theories of testimony is explaining how the 
interpersonal dimension of a testimonial relationship adds anything to the 
epistemic standing of an audience’s testimonial belief.19 A version of this 
worry then exists for the second personal theory of testimony: epistemic 
                                                   
16 Ibid., p.127. 
17 Ibid., p.127. 
18 Ibid., p.136. 
19 This challenge is pressed forcefully by Lackey (2008), ch.8. I address it in Faulkner (2011), 
ch.6§5. Nickel (2012) and Fricker (2012) also provide responses. 
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authority seems, at root, to be third personal, or depend “fundamentally on a 
person’s relations to facts and evidence”. 20  Thus Darwall observes the 
following. 
As recent discussion of testimony have brought out, there are cases in 
which doxastic reasons are at least superficially second-personal. 
Someone can give you a reason to believe something not just by 
pointing to evidence, but also by simply telling you it is so. When you 
believe something for this reason, you give the person whose 
testimony you trust a kind of second-personal authority in your own 
reasoning about what to believe. But this authority is not second-
personal all the way down. It ultimately depends upon and is defeasible 
by epistemic authority.21 
It depends upon epistemic authority in that a condition on someone’s telling 
giving a second personal reason for belief would seem to be that one believe 
the person to be an epistemic authority.22 And this is just the same challenge 
that assurance theories face: given that this belief is sufficient for having a 
reason, what does the second personal reason add?  
McMyler’s response to Darwall’s worry is essentially twofold. First, he 
concedes that some judgement that a speaker is epistemically competent is 
necessary for an audience’s possession of a second personal testimonial 
reason. In this respect, telling is like counsel rather than command; “both 
testimony and advice typically generate reasons for an audience only if the 
audience judges the speaker to be relevantly competent with respect to her 
testimony and advice.”23 But then, second, he asserts that this concession has 
no impact on the claim that tellings provide second personal reasons.  
While it is true that the kind of reason for belief provided by a 
speaker’s telling typically requires that the audience see the speaker as 
standing in a position of authority with respect to the facts … [t]he 
competence and reliability of the speaker is simply a background 
condition that must be in place if the speaker is to be in a position to 
herself generate the reason for belief provided by her coming out and 
telling the audience that p.24 
This might be true: being in fact competent and reliable with respect to p 
might well be necessary for a speaker being able genuinely to give an audience 
                                                   
20 Darwall (2006), p.12. 
21 Ibid., p.57, my italics. 
22 Darwall continues, p.57, “Someone can address reasons for belief, therefore, only if we take 
him to have some epistemic authority, or, at least, only if we don’t take him to have none.” 
But this second disjunct is too weak: the claim that a believed lack of epistemic authority can 
undermine the second personal reason a telling provides does not challenge the idea that 
such a second person reason suffices for warrant, other things being equal.  
23 McMyler (2011), p.159. 
24 Ibid., p.161. 
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a second personal reason to believe that p. However, this is not the issue. The 
issue is that if an audience must believe a speaker to be competent and reliable 
in order to possess this second personal reason, there is then a worry that this 
second personal reason fails to add anything epistemically because this belief 
in competence and reliability itself suffices for the audience to be justified in 
believing what the speaker says.  
Again, I think, this criticism can met. But I want to question McMyler’s 
first concession, namely that a belief in the speaker’s competence is necessary; 
this is a concession that he should not make. In telling an audience that p a 
speaker’s expectation is that the audience believe that p because the audience 
believes him. As audiences we can then cause affront both through disbelief 
and through believing for the wrong reasons. The wrong reason to believe that 
p is to believe it on the basis of assessing the evidential value of the speaker’s 
telling, of regarding the telling merely as a piece of advice to be deliberated 
over. With so much McMyler would agree. But then to require that the 
audience first believe that the speaker is competent and reliable with respect 
to p before believing the speaker is to require that the audience first assess the 
evidential value of the speaker’s telling – where this manifests the desire for 
epistemic autonomy, McMyler might say – and this is to fail to believe the 
speaker. Belief in the speaker must come first, and the presumption of 
competence and reliability must follow from this. 
The mistake, I think, is made in McMyler’s account of second personal 
trust, which takes trust to be fully cognitive. So trusting a speaker for the 
truth as to p requires believing that the speaker will tell the truth as to p. This 
then implies the belief that the speaker is competent, reliable and so on. A 
consequence of this is that trust is unavailable in situations of doubt and 
uncertainty. However, it is precisely the availability of trust in these 
situations that can be of such importance. Thus consider the case of the good 
shopkeeper who knowingly employs someone convicted of theft. It might be 
that the shopkeeper’s grounds for thinking that her new employee is telling 
the truth are quite equivocal. It might be that her reasons for thinking that he 
desires to reform at best no more than off-set her knowledge of his history. 
But she can still trust him with the till, and when he tells her it balances at 
the end of the day. This is an option because in trust one can put doubt to one 
side. And one can do this only insofar as trust does not require belief.25  
Now McMyler gives two arguments for a belief requirement. First, he 
observes that “[w]e typically trust the people we have most reason to trust, 
and hence our ordinary practice of trusting others seems to track 
                                                   
25 This case also illustrates why trust does not entail belief. The shopkeeper can bracket her 
beliefs that raise a doubt as to her employees trustworthiness, in order to trust, but she could 
not bracket these beliefs in order to believe her employee trustworthy. I discuss this case 
further in Faulkner (2011), p.117. 
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trustworthiness quite closely”.26 This is true: trust is normally coincident with 
belief, but this in no way implies that one cannot trust without belief. Second, 
McMyler gives a couple of cases where one tells an audience something out of 
the ordinary or something that matters much to the audience and then 
demands the audience’s trust. Of these cases he says, “your trusting me 
doesn’t seem to merely result in your believing what I say but to positively 
require your believing what I say. Imagine what would happen if you informed 
me that you didn’t actually believe [what I said] … but that you would rely on 
my goodwill nevertheless. I might quite naturally respond, ‘What, don’t you 
trust me?’”27 This argument rests on an equivocation in ‘require’. Certainly it 
is true that if you didn’t believe me, but merely acted as if you did, I would be 
affronted if I learnt this. But when trust results in belief this is not what 
happens. To trust a speaker just is to believe them. And if precondition of trust 
were belief, then it could not be demanded, as it is in these cases. 
‘X trusts Y to φ’ does not require that X believe Y will φ, it rather 
involves X having the expectation of Y, namely that Y will be moved to φ by 
X’s need that he do so. Thus X will be prone to distinctive reactive attitudes 
were Y not to φ, or to φ for other reasons. This expectation, held in a situation 
where X’s dependence on Y φ-ing is salient, then generates the presumption in 
X that Y will φ. Suppose trust is understood thus – that is understood as 
affective rather than cognitive – trust itself thereby generates no requirement 
of belief. And if one can trust a speaker without believing the speaker to be 
competent and reliable, there seems to be no epistemic constraint on 
possessing second-personal testimonial reasons. In this case, how is it that 
these testimonial reasons fail to be second personal ‘all the way down’? I 
explore this question in the next two sections. 
 
6.   
The second personal domain is defined by a closed circle of concepts (see 
section 2). One person making a purportedly valid demand on another is a 
starting point on this circle and a description of what happens in testimony. 
Consider the testimonial situation wherein a speaker X tells an audience Y 
that p, and the audience Y (affectively) trusts the speaker X for the truth as to 
whether p – and call this the testimonial situation. Here both speaker X and 
audience Y place demands on each other. In telling Y that p, X will be 
susceptible to the reactive attitude of resentment were Y not to believe him. 
The susceptibility to this reactive attitude makes an implicit demand of Y that 
Y believe him. And in trusting X for the truth as to whether p, Y will equally 
be susceptible to the reactive attitude of resentment, and to feelings of 
                                                   
26 McMyler (2011), p.114. 
27 Ibid., p.132. 
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betrayal, were X not to tell the truth as to whether p. The susceptibility to 
these reactive attitudes equally makes an implicit demand of X that X tells Y 
the truth as to whether p. In this section, I want to focus on these speaker and 
audience demands in order to show how telling and trust are partly second 
personal. In the next section, I argue that they are only partly so, and thereby 
fail to be second personal ‘all the way down’. 
Consider first the speaker demand. The case for this demand being 
second personal has already been made, but briefly to reiterate: this demand 
is second personal in two respects. First, the demand is addressed to a specific 
person (or persons) and purports to be justified. “It is an insult”, Anscombe 
observes, “and it may be an injury not to be believed”.28 The possibility of this 
affront engenders a susceptibility to resent any disbelief. This proneness to 
resentment places a demand on Y that Y believe X when X tells him that p. 
Belief is not subject to the will, so X cannot demand that Y believe that p, but 
the demand is rather that Y believe him, where this is a matter of trusting him 
for the truth.29 And provided trust is interpreted non-cognitively – and so to 
require merely the presumption that Y can look at the testimonial situation 
in a certain way – X can demand this of Y. This demand is then put forward as 
justified: the presumption is that Y ought to look at things this way, and trust 
X.30 Second, there is an entailment relation between this demand and Y’s 
having a second personal reason to believe that p. The demand is that Y trust, 
and if Y does so then Y will take a positive view of the intentions constitutive 
of X’s act of telling him that p. In telling Y that p, X intends that Y believe that 
p and believe that p because he intends this. To take a positive view of X’s 
telling is to take X’s telling in this way and so as providing such a reason to 
believe that p. It is thereby to view the telling as an assumption of 
responsibility, and the positive view is then of X standing behind what is told 
ready to justify or source the justification for what is told. So in demanding 
that Y believe him, and so believe that p, X demands that Y see his telling as 
giving this distinctive reason to believe that p. A reason, as McMyler observes, 
which “justifies belief in virtue of relations of authority and responsibility”. 
Consider next the audience demand. In trusting X for the truth as to 
whether p, Y will resent, even feel betrayed by, any deception or undue 
carelessness on X’s part. This proneness to resentment places a demand on X 
that X respond in a trustworthy way to Y’s need to know whether p; that is, on 
the assumption that this need is ordinary and non-intrusive, that X see Y’s 
need to know whether p as a reason to tell Y whether p and be moved by this 
reason. This audience demand is then second personal for the same two 
reasons as the speaker demand. First, the demand is addressed to a specific 
                                                   
28 Anscombe (1979), p.150. 
29 This also follows Anscombe who says, “we can see that believing someone (in the particular 
case) as trusting him for the truth – in the particular case”. Ibid., p.151. 
30 Where this is true, in my view, because there are norms of trust. See Faulkner (2011), ch.7§3. 
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person (or persons) and purports to be justified. Thus in the testimonial 
situation, the presumption is that X ought to look at things this way, this 
ought to be X’s reason for telling Y that p, and since X would be trustworthy, 
were this so, this is to say that X ought to be trustworthy.31 Second there is an 
entailment relation between this demand and X’s having a reason to tell Y 
whether p. Indeed, there are two ways of making out this entailment. First, in 
trusting X for the truth as to whether p, Y expects X to view the testimonial 
situation in a certain way; that is, Y expects X to see his need to know whether 
p as a reason to tell him whether p and, other things being equal, expects X to 
be moved by this reason. Suppose X does view things this way. Then X will see 
Y’s need to know whether p as a reason to do what Y expects. There is then an 
entailment from Y’s demand to X’s having this reason that comes by way of 
common cause: what explains Y’s having the expectation that Y has in trust is 
the existence of norms of trust whose internalization leads X to see Y’s 
informational dependence in the way Y expects. Second, in recognizing Y’s 
need to know whether p, X would ordinarily also recognize the trusting 
attitude that Y takes to depending on X for this information. That Y trusts X 
for the truth as to whether p – that is, that Y takes this particular attitude – 
then gives X a further reason to tell the truth, or at least it gives X a reason to 
do this insofar as X cares not to be the object of the various reactive attitudes 
that Y would be prone to, were X not to do this.32 Given that there are two 
ways of supporting the entailment from Y’s demand to X’s having a reason, 
and that this entailment is a defining feature of second personal reasons, this 
reason might thereby be regarded as second personal.  
 
7.   
The testimonial situation, I argued in the last section, is characterized by 
there being two putatively valid demands. These demands entail the existence 
of reasons for doing what is demanded. So it is possible to make the claim that 
telling and trust are at least partly second personal. In this section, I want to 
argue that each is only partly so and that neither is second personal all the 
way down. The strategy for arguing this will be to claim these purportedly 
valid demands entail neither the supporting authority to address them, nor 
the right to hold the other partly accountable for meeting them. And without 
authority or accountability the case for the reason for doing what is 
demanded being genuinely second personal is undermined. 
Consider first the demand implicit in a speaker’s telling. This is the 
demand that the audience Y believe X in the testimonial situation where X 
tells Y that p. The speaker X does not have the authority to demand this of Y 
                                                   
31 See note 30. 
32 See Pettit (1995). 
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because by believing him Y will thereby believe that p, and in matters of belief 
there is the rational demand that Y be responsive to epistemic considerations 
– that is, matters of evidence. Now it is, I think, a fundamental feature of trust 
that we have some scope to choose to trust. And this introduces some 
distance between trust and evidence. This distance is manifest on those 
occasions when we give a person the benefit of the doubt – as in the 
shopkeeper case. However, distance is not divorce: while there is some scope 
for bracketing the evidence, this scope is limited. This limitation is then 
manifest in the fact that trust is not always possible, even for those who have 
a trusting disposition. Moreover, as audiences we rationally ought to be 
sensitive to the evidence, and it is this rational demand that undercuts 
speakers’ authority to demand belief. Thus consider two cases. In the 
epistemically simple case, the testimonial situation is characterized by Y 
having ample background evidence for X’s trustworthiness and so for the 
truth of p, when this is what X tells Y. Simple cases are common, as McMyler 
notes: a case where X and Y are close friends might be one. In the 
epistemically complex case, the testimonial situation is characterized by Y 
having equivocal evidence for X’s trustworthiness such that p might be as 
likely false as not, when this is what X tells Y. The shopkeeper case is such a 
complex case. In both cases, X might demand that Y believe him. And in both 
cases this is the demand that Y believe because of trust. In the simple case, 
this demand is that Y come to believe that p because of trust rather than 
because of the evidence. In the complex case, that Y come to believe that p 
because of trust despite the evidence. However, in neither case does X have 
the authority to demand that Y ignore what it is rationally demanded that he 
respond to. Trust is something that is given; speakers can invite trust but do 
not have the authority to demand it. 
For the same reason that X does not have the authority to demand that 
Y believe him, and so believe that p, Y is not accountable to X for this. That is, 
Y cannot be so accountable because, in the complex case at least, the evidence 
can compel Y to believe not-p. This is to agree with Darwall: the reason for 
belief that telling gives is only “superficially second personal”.33 It is not 
second personal all the way down because it does not have the necessary 
conceptual ties to authority and accountability needed to be so. This failure of 
the second person theory of testimony comes out, I think, in its failure as an 
account of testimonial knowledge. There are two questions for any theory of 
testimony: what justifies an audience’s testimonial uptake? And what explains 
the audience’s possession of testimonial knowledge? Trust can only address 
the first question. Thus in considering a case where I believe testimony to a 
theorem from a mathematician who has proved the theorem, McMyler 
observes “[t]he mathematician’s testimony appears to be what justifies my 
                                                   
33 Darwall (2006), p.57. 
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belief in the truth of the theorem, not the proof itself.”34 Yes, it is the telling 
that justifies, in the manner described, my believing the theorem. But no: it is 
the existence of the proof that explains why this believing is an instance of 
knowing the theorem. 
Consider now the trusting side of testimonial relation, and the demand 
implicit in an audience’s trust. This is the demand, placed in trusting X for the 
truth as to whether p, that X tell Y whether p – that is, tell Y the truth as to 
whether p. In some situations, Y can have the authority to demand this: the 
courtroom is one such situation. However, in the courtroom, Y’s authority to 
make this demand comes from the legal proceedings; it is not contained 
within the testimonial situation as characterised. The reason that Y does not 
have this authority is that insofar as there is a demand on X that X tells Y the 
truth as to whether p or be trustworthy, this demand is generated by Y’s need 
– or the fact of Y’s dependence – it is not generated by Y’s attitude of trust. 
This might be illustrated by a case of trust and error. Imagine a hot parched 
land and Y arriving thirsty at X’s homestead. He asks X for water from the 
well that stands in front on X’s house, and X responds by telling Y that he 
can’t have that water and then goes inside closing the door on Y. In fact X has 
gone to fetch Y some clean water from the tank at the back of the house, the 
water in the well being poisoned by livestock that fell into it and died at the 
start of Spring. Not knowing this, Y will resent X’s refusal to give him water 
from the well. But the fact of Y’s resentment, which articulates the demand 
that X give him water from the well, does not imply that Y has the authority 
to demand that X do this. In the situation as described, this would be the 
wrong, and the untrustworthy, thing to do. For the same reason that Y does 
not have the authority to demand that X does this, X is not accountable to Y 
for doing what Y demands. 
This point is made and developed by Knud Ejler Løgstrup in his 
discussion of trust.  
The other person’s interpretation of the implication of the trust 
offered [that is, the trusting party Y’s interpretation] … is one thing, 
and the demand which is implicit in that trust … which I must 
interpret is quite another thing.35 
Responding to trust cannot be “merely a matter of fulfilling the other person’s 
expectations and granting his or her wishes”.36 This is because, in the trust 
situation, such as that of the poisoned well, “what we are speaking of is a 
demand for love, not for indulgence”.37 Thus the demand on the trusted – what 
Løgstrup calls the radical ethical demand and might be called the demand 
                                                   
34 McMyler (2011), p.90.  
35 Løgstrup (1997), p.21. 
36 Ibid., p.21. 
37 Ibid., p.21. 
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that X be trustworthy – is generated by the fact of the trusting party’s 
dependence. That is to say, in the poisoned well case, what X should respond 
to is Y’s needs, not Y’s expectations, which might be mistaken in various ways. 
In this respect, Løgstrup observes that this demand “is contained – 
unarticulated – in the fact that in trust or in mistrust the other person’s life 
has to a greater or lesser degree been delivered into our hands”.38 This is to 
say, given that it is the fact of dependence that generates the demand to be 
trustworthy, that the other party trusts is inessential. Let me call this 
Løgstrup’s Point.39 
Løgstrup’s point, I think, applies equally to trust as it is found in the 
testimonial situation. To illustrate and argue this, consider the case of an 
affair. Suppose X and Y are friends, Y’s partner is having an affair, X knows 
this, and this is a case where there is no question of it being best that Y know 
it too. Now suppose, his suspicions aroused, Y asks X whether X thinks his 
partner is being unfaithful, and trusts X in asking this. Why should X tell Y 
what he knows? On the second personal view, it is because Y asked, in asking 
trusted, and in trusting implicitly placed a demand for the truth. This seems 
right: Y’s asking X for information does determine a reason for X to tell Y 
what he knows. Løgstrup’s point can then be presented as the claim that this 
is not the fundamental moral reason, which is that X should tell Y what he 
knows because Y needs to know this, and Y’s trust in this case merely makes 
salient Y’s need. That this is the right reason for telling Y the truth can then 
be brought out by imagining a variation on the case. Suppose now that, 
although his suspicions are aroused, Y asks nothing of X and X tells Y 
nothing. Later Y discovers the affair and that X knew about it all along. In this 
case, I conjecture, Y would be liable to resent X’s silence. X should have told 
him about the affair given that it was clearly best that he know. And the 
content of Y’s resentment then makes it clear that right reason for telling Y 
about the affair in the previous case where Y did trust X for the truth in this 
matter starts not from Y’s trust but the need that this trust makes obvious. 
In sum, in trusting X for the truth as to whether p, Y implicitly 
demands that X tell him whether p. However, Y does not have any authority 
to make this demand. “To trust”, Løgstrup observes, “is to lay oneself open.”40 
                                                   
38 Ibid., p.110, my emphasis. 
39 Things are slightly more complex. What generates any obligation X has to φ is Y’s need that 
he do so. However Y’s trusting X can generate this need. To take an example of Løgstrup’s: if 
John has lent me a book, my reason for returning it should just be that John needs it. But 
John might only need that I return his book because he trusted me with it in the first place. 
But then if trust generates the need, why doesn’t it generate the obligation? The answer, I 
think, is that trust merely alters the non-normative facts that determine what the trusted has 
moral reason to do – in David Enoch’s terms, trust is ‘triggering reason’ rather than a ‘robust 
reason’, see Enoch (2011). Y’s attitude of trust doesn’t itself X give a moral reason to φ, but it 
might give X an instrumental reason to do so (see the second entailment described in §6). 
40 Løgstrup (1997), p.9. 
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In trusting X, Y is dependent on X, and to be dependent is not to be in a 
position of authority. Morever, the demand that the trusted be trustworthy, 
which is implicit in Y’s trust, is keyed to Y’s dependence not the attitude of 
trust that Y has to this dependence. It follows that X is not accountable to Y 
for doing what Y expects in trusting him. Thus the trusting side of testimonial 
relation, like the telling side, fails to be second personal all the way down. The 
demand implicit in trust does not have the necessary conceptual ties to 
authority and accountability needed to be so. 
 
8.    
As we have seen, it is not possible to give a second person theory of either the 
telling or trusting dimensions of a testimonial relationship. Although both 
telling and trusting implicitly place demands on another party and give this 
party reasons, the ties to authority and accountability, necessary for these 
reasons being fully second personal, are lacking. It follows, I think, that moral 
obligation cannot be fully second personal either, since if it were so, the moral 
obligations generated within the trust situation would be so. But, if Løgstrup’s 
point is correct, these are not. What the trusted should do in the trust 
situation is determined by how things are in the world rather than by the 
attitudes of the trusting party.  
Return to the car-parking case. Darwall acknowledges that in such a 
case the anti-social driver might have a number of reasons for moving his car. 
In addition to the second personal reason generated by the boxed-in driver’s 
demand that he move his car, he can have third personal reasons for so doing 
(and here Darwall identifies two).41 Løgstrup’s point is then that if the anti-
social driver has to wait to be asked, he demonstrates no care for the boxed-in 
driver. He is not moved by the reason that should move him. In a trust 
situation, or more precisely a situation where another party depends in 
someway on one’s doing something, the fundamental reason that the one has 
for acting is that the other party depends on one in some way. This is a third 
person or state-of-the-world regarding reason. That this state-of-the-world is 
the locus of the moral reason is then made clearest by cases of error. 
Darwall’s response to such error possibilities would, I think, be to say 
that second personal reasons are determined by the expectations of the moral 
community.42 That is, in a situation where X depends on Y φ-ing – moving his 
car, getting off his foot, giving him water, telling him about his wife’s affair, 
                                                   
41 See Darwall (2013), pp.136-8. 
42 This is the response Darwall gives to Wallace who raises a parallel objection: there can be 
obligations even when no demand is addressed. Yes, says Darwall, because it would be 
addressed by the moral community. See Wallace (2007), p.26 and Darwall (2007), p.64. 
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etc. – what Y has reason to do is determined, most fundamentally not by X’s 
demands but by what the moral community would demand of Y. 
More cautiously, as far as the concept of moral responsibility is 
concerned, it is tied to responsibility to those with the authority to 
hold responsible (moral community).43 
Thus when we do make a demand of another, “we make a demand on her 
conduct not as individuals but as representatives of the moral community”.44 
So in the situation where X depends on Y φ-ing, there is no worry about X 
misconceiving this situation because it is the moral community, not X, that 
holds Y responsible. Moreover, this is built into Darwall’s presupposition of 
second personal competence: the reason that authority follows endorsement – 
that the taking of another’s demand as valid is enough for it to be 
authoritative – is that in being second personally competent an agent 
functions properly as “an equal member of the moral community”.45 
The problem with this response, I think, is that it faces a dilemma. On 
the one side, suppose that the moral community is non-idealized – like actual 
communities. In this case, the problem is that the community could be just as 
much in error as X with respect to the question of what, if anything, X’s 
dependence on Y gives Y a reason to do. The possibility of error follows from 
the claim that such a situation of care generates a state-of-the-world regarding 
obligation. In this respect, Løgstrup observes that social norms “serve as a 
guide” to the radical ethical demand, so of what Y has reason to do.46 But this 
is merely an epistemic claim: what Y, first and foremost, has reason to do is 
not equivalent to what is socially demanded; and must rather simply be 
figured out using “insight, imagination and understanding”.47 
On the other side, suppose that the moral community is idealized – not 
like any actual community, and so not susceptible to these failings. This seems 
to be Darwall’s suggestion.  
[T]he moral community as I understand it is not any actual community 
composed of actual human beings. It is like Kant’s idea of a ‘realm of 
ends’, a regulative ideal that we employ to make sense of an ethical 
thought and practice.48 
                                                   
43 Darwall (2006), n.6, p.68. 
44 Darwall (2010), p.223. 
45 Ibid., p.221. 
46 Løgstrup (1997), p.58. 
47 Ibid., p.22. Similarly, Wallace observes that a downtrodden individual could further “have 
the misfortune of living in a community which nobody else can get exercised about those 
indignities either”. Wallace (2007), p.27. 
48 Darwall (2007), p.64. 
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However, in this case, a couple of difficult problems are raised for a second 
personal account of moral obligation. First, the issue of the authority that we 
actually have to make the demands that we put forward as purportedly valid 
becomes problematic. Take the case where X trusts Y to φ and, with the 
expectation distinctive of trust and its accompanying propensity to the 
reactive attitudes, thereby implicitly demands that Y φ. The question of 
whether X has the authority to demand this now becomes the question of 
whether an idealised moral community would hold Y responsible for φ-ing. 
But, and this is the first problem, answering this question seems no easier 
than, or indeed different to, answering the question of whether, in the 
dependence situation created by X’s trust, God would demand Y φ. Second, in 
addition to this epistemological problem, there is a metaphysical problem. If 
it is the judgement of the idealised moral community that defines whether Y 
has, first and foremost, a reason to φ, this reason seems to be no different in 
character to third personal reasons. For this shifts the locus of authority away 
from X and in doing so it is no longer true that Y is accountable to X. Thus the 
conceptual relations that would make any reason that Y has to φ second 
personal are no longer present. The reason that Y has to φ, if Y has any such 
reason, is no different in character to the reason that Y would have if God 
demanded this.  
 
9.    
Løgstrup’s ruminations on trust are part of a sustained criticism of Kantian 
moral theory, which he thinks pays insufficient attention to the needs of 
others. For example, Løgstrup gives a case of borrowing a book from a friend 
John with the promise to return it by noon. The right thing to do is return the 
book by this time. And, importantly, the right reason for doing this is just the 
thought “John needs the book”.49 Only with this thought is one’s attitude 
towards John not indifference. And, Løgstrup continues, “if the motivating 
reason for my returning the book to John at the promised time is not one of 
consideration for John but my resolve to live in accordance with the general 
principle that promises should be kept, my act is not moral but moralistic.”50 
As such, any moral theory that puts duty above a particular concern for the 
people to whom duty is owed to – such as Kant’s – is ‘moralistic’, which “is 
morality’s way of being immoral”.51 This paper has then attempted to follow a 
parallel trajectory. A consideration of the testimonial trust situation reveals 
something about right reason for action. These reasons, I’ve argued following 
Løgstrup, are not second personal. This then tells against both McMyler’s 
                                                   
49 Løgstrup (2007), p.103. 
50 Ibid., p.105. 
51 Ibid., p.103. 
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second personal theories of testimony and trust, and Darwall’s second 
personal theory of moral obligation.52 
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